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IMPACT FEES: AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TO FINANCE
PUBLIC FACILITIES IN MISSISSIPPI
Kenneth D. Farmer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Local governments have traditionally financed public facilities and ser-
vices through the use of tax revenues or the issuance of general obligation
bonds or revenue bonds.' General obligation bonds are repaid by future
property tax collections, while revenue bonds are repaid through the net
revenues of the utility to be constructed, acquired, or improved.2 Financing
public facilities through such "debt instruments" has historically been
viewed as a favorable investment option since they are usually welcomed
on the open market.' This is because bonds are generally backed by the
full faith and credit of the issuing community.' These traditional methods
of financing the construction of public facilities required by new develop-
ment are alive and well in Mississippi today.'
However, local governments throughout Mississippi are quickly learn-
ing what local governments in other states have known for years - tradi-
tional financing mechanisms have limits. 6 They present a number of
challenges which can make it difficult for all but the most popular projects
to secure financing.' For example, Mississippi requires three-fifths voter
approval in favor of the issuance of bonds before they can be used by the
local governing authority. 8 In addition, a number of statutorily required
* Attorney, YoungWilliams, P.A.; J.D., University of Florida; M.S., University of Florida; B.S.,
University of Southern Mississippi. I would especially like to thank Professor Donald E. Campbell for
his help in the preparation of this paper.
1. Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of
American Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 51, 51-52 (1987);
2. Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-33-87 (2008) (granting municipalities the power to levy and collect
taxes on all taxable property for the purpose of paying off municipal bonds); Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-27-
23 (2008) (authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds for the purpose of acquiring, improving, and
maintaining a municipally owned utility).
3. "The U.S. Municipal Bond rating Scale: Mapping to the Global rating Scale and assigning
Global Scale ratings to Municipal obligations," Moody's, March 2007 (finding the 10-year cumulative
default rate for all Moody's-rated municipal bond issuers to stand at 0.1032%, while the default rate for
all corporate bonds during the same period was at 9.6999% rate), available at http://v2.moodys.com/
cust/default.asp (last visited January 3, 2009).
4. Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-33-305 (2008) (pledging revenue of the utility to be constructed with
proceeds thereof in addition to the pledge of full faith and credit of the municipality).
5. See generally Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-65-75 (2008) (providing for a share of state sales taxes
collected within each municipality to be paid to that municipality); and Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-33-53
(2008) (requiring municipalities to assess and collect ad valorem taxes in the same way as counties).
6. See Bauman, supra note 1, at 51-52 (citing state mandated limitations on bond indebtedness
and competitive bond markets as complications of using traditional financing mechanisms).
7. See James C. Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, 50 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 86 (1987) (discussing the limits of taxes and bond revenues as a funding source
for public infrastructure improvements).
8. Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-33-311.
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procedures must be followed prior to the issuance of bonds and certain
limitations apply,' specifically with respect to the amount of interest that
may be charged 1o and the maximum time for bonds to mature.1 Couple
these requirements with the fact that such financing mechanisms may re-
quire property tax increases, utility rate increases, or reductions in existing
services, and these approaches tend to be politically unpopular.
Because of the problems associated with traditional financing mecha-
nisms, local governments have increasingly sought alternative financing
sources for construction of public facilities and provision of services.12 Ar-
guably the most popular alternative to taxes or bonds is the "impact fee."
This Article explores the evolution of impact fee jurisprudence in Missis-
sippi, and suggests that, given the Mississippi Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Mayor and Board of Aldermen, City of Ocean Springs v.
Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss., Inc.," enabling legislation is both appropriate
and necessary.
Part II provides a brief discussion on what impact fees are and how
they developed. Part III discusses potential challenges to impact fees and
the analysis commonly employed by courts to determine the validity of im-
pact fees enacted by local governments. Part IV discusses the Mississippi
Supreme Court decision in Ocean Springs and its effect on the validity of
impact fees in Mississippi. Part V concludes by advocating that the Missis-
sippi legislature adopt impact fee enabling legislation in response to the
Ocean Springs opinion, and provides some suggestions the legislature
should consider when drafting enabling legislation to ensure that future im-
pact fee ordinances are not invalidated by Mississippi courts.
II. EVOLUTION OF IMPACT FEES
Shifting the cost of funding new public facilities from the community
at large to new development is not a new idea. The concept has its origins
in the early 1900's when planning and economic development professionals
across the country began voicing concern about urban sprawl and the in-
creased cost of providing public facilities to support the booming outlying
9. Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-33-307.
10. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-17-101 (setting the maximum interest rate of all such bonds issued by
the State, county, municipality or political subdivision thereof); and Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-27-45 and
Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-17-103 (limiting the maximum interest rate to maturity for revenue bonds to
13% per annum).
11. Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-33-315 (governing the maturity and interest of municipal bonds);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-27-45 (limiting revenue bonds to a maximum maturity equal to the estimated life
of the contemplated system or improvement-in no event longer than thirty years).
12. Nicholas, supra note 7, at 88. Professor Nicholas states:
Increasingly, local governments have been turning to impact exactions or payments in lieu
(impact fees) as a means of financing the growing need for capital improvements. Such ap-
proaches shift the incidence of the cost of such improvements from the public to the devel-
oper. In turn, this shift can impose the ultimate burden upon the developer, the purchaser, or
the property owner. Id. (citing James Nicholas, State Regulation /Housing Prices, 27-42
(1982)).
13. Mayor and Board of Aldermen, City of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss., Inc.,
932 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 2006).
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residential areas. 1 4 in response to their concerns, and as a result of mount-
ing court challenges, the United States Department of Commerce drafted
the Standard City Planning and Zoning Enabling Acts in the 1920s." The
Acts were designed in large measure to provide guidance to state legisla-
tures that sought to authorize local governments, through the adoption of
state subdivision regulations, to require developers to provide on-site facili-
ties.16 Local governments continued to use general revenue from local
taxes to fund off-site public facilities."
As communities continued to expand however, local governments be-
gan to realize that a new development's impact was not limited to the de-
velopment itself-it also placed heavy burdens on off-site facilities." By
the 1940s, local governments in high growth areas were simply unable to
meet the increased demands for off-site facilities with revenues produced
by the traditional financing mechanisms.19 To meet the increasing de-
mands, local governments began to require developers to dedicate land for
public use or make cash payments in-lieu of land dedication, which the
local government would then use to build/upgrade public facilities to meet
the new demand. 20 While public dedications and in-lieu fees proved to be
a short term success, they could not generate sufficient funding in the long
term to keep pace with the demands created by increased growth.2 1 Even-
tually, as consumer demand for a broader range of public facilities and ser-
vices increased and local revenue sources declined, local governments
began adopting the policy that new development was only acceptable if it
could "pay its own way. "22
14. James C. Nicholas, State and Regional Land Use Planning: The Evolving Role of the State, 73
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1069, 1071 (1999) (discussing how land development and use regulations became
acceptable methods for resolving conflicts as individual states became more urbanized); See also Arthur
C. Nelson, Preface to Development Impact Fees, 54 J. AM. PLANNING ASS'N 3, 3-4 (1988).
15. Department of Commerce, Standard State Zoning Act (1926), available at http://my-
apa.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingActl928.pdf (authorizing local governments to require
developers to build streets, water mains, and sewer lines within the boundaries of their developments).
16. Id.; Patricia Burgess, Planning for the Private Interest: Land Use Controls and Residential
Patterns in Columbus, Ohio, 1900-1970 66-67 (1947) available at http://ohiostatepress.org/Books/Com-
plete%20PDFs/Burgess%20Planning/06.pdf
17. Edward J. Sullivan & Isa Lester, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Infrastructure Fi-
nancing, 37 URB. LAw. 53, 57 (2005) (the first exactions were limited to on-site improvements, while
off-site improvements such as parks, treatment plants, and arterial roads continued to be financed out
of the general revenue through local taxes).
18. Id. at 57-58.
19. Id. at 57.
20. Id. at 58.
21. Charles C. Mulcahy & Michelle J. Zimet, Impact Fees for a Developing Wisconsin, 79 MARQ.
L. REV. 759, 765 (1996).
22. Bauman, supra note 1, at 52; See also James C. Nicholas & Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer,
Market Based Approaches to Environmental Preservation: To Environmental Mitigation Fees and Be-
yond, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 837, 839-40 (2003) (discussing the factors that led to change in attitudes
about new growth). According to Nicholas and Juergensmeyer:
The first of these events was the sharp rise in inflation in the 1970s and the decimation of fixed
based taxes such as the motor fuels tax. The next was the federal government's fiscal retrench-
ment that began in 1982 and has continued since then, thus reducing the funds made available
to local jurisdictions. The third factor leading to the breakdown of the traditional approach
was the general hostility to the taxation of real property, thus forcing local jurisdictions to look
2009] IMPACT FEES 289
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Today the most common alternative used by local governments to
fund public facilities that arise as a result of new development is the "im-
pact fee."" Impact fees are a form of "monetary exaction" that are de-
fined as one-time charges applied by local government to new development
for the purpose of raising revenue to fund the construction or expansion of
the capital facilities required as a result of the new development.24 Impact
fees are commonly assessed to provide for the additional roads, schools,
libraries, water and sewer systems, or parks and recreation facilities made
necessary by the presence of new residential developments.2 5 Impact fees
are not charged for or used to fund ongoing operations or maintenance of
these facilities. 26 Rather, they are charged for the limited purpose of ena-
bling the construction of new public facilities or the expansion of existing
public facilities that are required as a result of the new development.2 7
Impact fees serve a number of very important functions. First, impact
fees allow local governments to accommodate new development without
increasing taxes on existing residents or decreasing public services. 28 Im-
pact fees accomplish this by shifting the costs of financing public facilities
from the taxpayers at large to the beneficiaries of the new facilities. 29 Sec-
ond, impact fees allow local governments to conserve their resources by
reserving the use of traditional funding mechanisms for ongoing operation
and maintenance of public facilities."o Finally, impact fees force developers
elsewhere to fund the ever increasing demands of constituents. Because these factors were
occurring at a time when the pace of urban development was increasing, both the demand for
and the cost of investment in public infrastructure began to climb at a time when the available
resources were falling. As a result, there arose an increasing need for investment concurrent
with declining means. Id.
23. James C. Nicholas & Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Market Based Approaches to Environ-
mental Preservation: To Environmental Mitigation Fees and Beyond, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 837, 843
(2003). See e.g., ARTHUR C. NELSON, ET AL., A GUIDE TO IMPACT FEES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY
19 (2008) (finding that the role of impact fees as supplemental, but is now primary), and Ronald H.
Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact
Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 262 (2006) ("All evidence points to the rapid spread of land development
impact fees throughout the nation making it a prevalent means of funding new growth.").
24. ARTHUR C. NELSON, ET AL., A GUIDE TO IMPACT FEES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 3
(2008) [hereinafter, Nelson].
25. Id. at 2.
26. Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for
Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 205-206 (noting that operational or maintenance ex-
penses are regarded as the proper subject of tax or user fee support); See also AMERICAN PLANNING
ASSOCIATION, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND
THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE (Stuart Meck ed., American Planning Association 2002), available at
http://planning.org/growingsmart/guidebook/eight04.htm#commdif. Impact fees are not intended to
pay for the maintenance of existing public facilities or to cover operating expenses. Id. at 8-141
Commentary.
27. Id.; See also ALAN A. ALTSHULER, ET AL., REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS 51 (1993) (the purpose of impact fees "must be to finance service
capacity for future occupants or to alleviate negative project impacts on the wider community.").
28. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 61 ("Impact fees allow local governments to accommodate new
development without increasing taxes on existing residents or decreasing public services.").
29. Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for
Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 210 (2006).
30. Id. at 209 (the use of impact fees reduces the need to access the capital markets in order to
borrow funds for capital construction, which in turn conserves local government's "limited borrowing
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to internalize the cost of expanding or improving overburdened public fa-
cilities, the destruction of wetlands or endangered species' habitats, and
various forms of pollution. 3
III. DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF IMPACT FEES
Although it is believed that impact fees are used in one form or an-
other in nearly all fifty states, their validity has been challenged on several
grounds.3 2 When determining whether to adopt impact fees as an alterna-
tive to the traditional financing mechanisms, state and local governments
would be well-advised to consider the various legal challenges that impact
fees are likely to face.
Challenges to impact fees generally fall into two categories. The
first, and most basic challenge, involves the authority of a local government
to enact an impact fee ordinance.34 Such a challenge often hinges on
whether there is express or implied authority to impose the fee and
whether the impact fee is actually a "fee" at all (or instead an invalid
"tax").3 ' The second challenge involves the constitutionality of impact fees
under the due process and equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment and whether the fee constitutes a regulatory taking under the
Fifth Amendment.36
A. Test for Authority
1. Express Authority
The threshold inquiry to any newly adopted impact fee ordinance in-
volves the authority of local governments to assess, collect and spend im-
pact fees for a particular public facility. To avoid such a challenge, many
states have enacted legislation that expressly authorizes local governments
authority and reduc[es] the future budgetary strain of debt service that would have been incurred to
finance the improvements").
31. Thomas W. Ledman, Local Government Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development Exac-
tions, the Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REV. 835, 836 (December 1993) ( arguing that Development
exactions are one method which local governments can use to force developers to internalize some of
the negative externalities, which developers pass on to society, including the cost of expanding or im-
proving overburdened public facilities, destruction of wetlands, destruction of endangered species' hab-
itats, and various forms of environmental pollution); See also Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing
Affordability, Cityscape, 2005, No. 1, at 139, 143 (arguing that impact fees may encourage efficiency by
making the developer and its customers internalize the full costs of the harms that the development
causes).
32. Nelson, supra note 24, at 49.
33. Thomas W. Ledman, Local Government Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development Exac-
tions, the Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REV. 835, 842 (1993).
34. Id.; See also Bauman, supra note 1, at 54 ("An impact fee imposed by a local agency and not
authorized by law will be struck down.").
35. Bauman, supra note 1, at 54 ("If a fee amount is not reasonably equivalent to the cost of the
regulated activity, or if the monies collected are deposited into the general treasury rather than a spe-
cial fund, the fee may be deemed a tax and therefore illegally adopted.").
36. Id.
2009] 291
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to impose impact fees. Indeed, some 27 states have enacted enabling legis-
lation authorizing the imposition of impact fees to varying degrees. 37 Im-
pact fees imposed pursuant to this express authority are generally deemed
valid, as long as they are consistent with the enabling statute and satisfy
constitutional requirements.
2. Implied Authority
Although state enabling legislation is certainly preferable, the absence
of enabling legislation does not doom local impact fee ordinances, but does
make their validity less certain. 3 Courts may imply the authority to enact
the fees from more general grants of authority.4 0 Jurisdictions adopting
this approach have held that, in the absence of enabling legislation, local
governments have the implied authority to impose impact fees based on
local government's general "police power" to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare pursuant to broad home rule authority.4 1
In order to determine whether a local government has implied author-
ity to impose impact fees, it is necessary to determine the extent of the local
government's police power.42 Local governments derive their powers, not
from the United States Constitution, but from state constitutions and state
statutes.4 3 Therefore, the extent to which local governments may use their
police powers to impose impact fees depends largely on whether the state
affords their local governments "Home Rule" authority or whether the
state continues to adhere to the strictures of "Dillon's Rule." 4 4
Where the State grants local governments home rule authority, the
local government is generally granted the full power of self-government not
37. Nelson, supra note 24, at 49.
38. Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, 26 URB. LAw. 541, 544
(authority is satisfied by explicit enabling legislation).
39. Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Perspec-
tive, 20 URB. LAw. 515, 526 (1988) (stating the "lack of express legislative authorization is not enough to
invalidate an ordinance imposing an exaction on a developer since such authorization is implied from
the state's statutory or constitutional home-rule provision"); See also Brian W. Blaesser & Christine M.
Kentopp, Impact Fees: The "Second Generation", 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 55, 85-89 (1990).
40. Ledman, supra note 31, at 842-43 ("local governments must derive their authority directly
from specific enabling legislation, other general land use enabling legislation, state taxing power, home
rule powers, or the broad police powers.").
41. Brian W. Blaesser, Impact Fees: The "Second Generation", 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 55, 85-89 (1990) (discussing other sources of authority for the adoption of impact fees) [hereinafter,
Blaesser].
42. Id. at 86.
43. U.S. CONsT. amend. X (providing that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."); See also BLACK'S LAw DicriONARY (8th ed. 2004) (police power is "[t]he inherent and ple-
nary power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to preserve the public security, order,
health, morality, and justice.").
44. See Blaesser, supra note 41, at 86-89 (concluding that general planning and zoning enabling
statutes are inadequate to justify the adoption of impact fees in most non-home rule states, while the
authority to adopt impact fees in home rule states under the same statutes are generally authorized
provided "it can be established that the financing of a particular type of facility or service is a matter of
local concern and not the exclusive jurisdiction of the state").
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inconsistent with the constitution or laws of the state.45 As such, local gov-
ernments could use their police power to impose impact fees on the basis
that the fees would protect the public from the negative effects of new
development, such as congestion and a lack of proper services or facili-
ties.4 6 While a local government's police power may be very broad, it is not
boundless.4 7 A local government may only impose a regulation pursuant to
its home rule police powers if the State has not expressly preempted the
regulation and if the regulation is a wholly local matter.4 8 If the State ad-
heres to Dillon's Rule, the local government only has "those powers ex-
pressly granted by law, powers incidental to those provided by law, and
powers which are considered indispensable to the accomplishment of the
purposes of a municipal corporation."49
3. Tax
A corollary to the issue of authority is whether the impact fee is "regu-
latory" in nature or actually an unauthorized tax.5 0 Since state constitu-
tions or statutes generally restrict the authority of local governments to
impose taxes, the characterization of an impact fee as a "tax" generally
renders an impact fee invalid. 1 The confusion over whether impact fees
constitute a fee or tax arises because "fees" share two very important char-
acteristics with taxes. 52 First, impact fees are generally levied by local gov-
ernments on developers as a monetary charge.5 3 Second, impact fees are
assessed on a proportional basis.54
"Fees," however, also have a number of traits which distinguish them
from taxes.55 First, they are generally charged for a particular governmen-
tal service which benefits the party paying the fee in a manner "not shared
by other members of society."*5  Next, "the party paying the fee has the
option of not utilizing the governmental service and thereby avoiding the
charge.",5  Finally, "the charges are collected not to raise revenues, but to
45. 1 McQuillin Municipal Corporations § 3.21.10 (Thompson West, 3d ed. 2008).
46. See Nicholas, supra note 22, at 840 (citing James C. Nelson, et al., A PRACTITIONER's GUIDE
To DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 13 (1991).
47. 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 391
(2008).
48. Id.
49. Id. at § 401.
50. Nick Rosenberg, Comment, Development Impact Fees: Is Limited Cost Internalization Actu-
ally Smart Growth?, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641, 651 (2003) (finding one of the primary chal-
lenges that local governments face when imposing impact fees is that the charges are not fees, but
instead taxes).




55. Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984) (categorizing fees as
"user fees", based on the rights of the entity as proprietor of the instrumentalities used, or "regulatory
fees", founded on the police power to regulate particular businesses or activities).
56. Id. (quoting Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. U.S., 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974)).
57. Id. (quoting Vanceburg v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 571 F.2d 630 (D.C.Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 (1978)).
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compensate the governmental entity providing the services for its ex-
penses."" Unfortunately, courts have not developed a uniform framework
for making the regulatory tax/fee determination.5 9 As such, it is important
for local governments to ensure that their impact fees are characterized as
regulatory "fees" rather than revenue raising devices in order to avoid the
implication of taxation.o
B. Test for Constitutionality
Even where authority exists for the imposition of impact fees, the abil-
ity of local governments to use impact fees to finance public facilities (or
regulate growth) is not absolute.6 1 Once the authority of the local govern-
ment has been established, the focus shifts to the constitutionality of the
impact fee ordinance. 62 In order to justify an impact fee, local govern-
ments must be able to demonstrate something more than just a generalized
connection between the development and impact fee.6 3 Local government
must be able to demonstrate that the impact fee: (i) is reasonable-mean-
ing it directly addresses the problem created by the development project
and is therefore reasonable, 64 (ii) does not violate equal protection-mean-
ing that it is applied to all parties on the same basis, 65 and (iii) is not a
"taking" under the Fifth Amendment (requiring just compensation). 6 6
Each of these requirements will be discussed in turn.
1. Reasonableness
The requirement of "reasonableness" under due process of law has
emerged as the primary standard for determining what types of public facil-
ities can be financed with impact fees. 67 Over the years, state courts have
developed three distinct tests of whether impact fees meet the standard of
reasonableness. 68 The first test, known as the "reasonable relationship
test," originated in 1949 and simply requires that the local government link
the impact fee charged to the need created by the new development. 6 9 This
58. Id.
59. TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 366 (Thomas E.
Roberts ed., 2002) (discussing two identical school impact fees - the "fee" prepared for St. Johns
County, Florida was found to be a permissible exercise of police power, while the same "fee" prepared
for Franklin, Massachusetts was found to be an unauthorized tax).
60. Nelson, supra note 38, at 544.
61. Nelson, supra note 38, at 545.
62. Nelson, supra note 38, at 544-45.
63. Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1983).
64. See Nelson, supra note 38, at 546-548.
65. Id.
66. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 837 (1987). Where the Nollan/Dolan analysis is applied, the test requires a nexus between the
impact and the fee demanded, and a rough proportionality between the fee and the impact.
67. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 221.
68. Id.
69. Ayres v. City of L.A., 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949) (finding that a municipality may require the
developer to provide the streets which are required by the activity within the subdivision but cannot
require him to provide a major thoroughfare, the need for which stems from the total activity of the
community).
294 [VOL. 28:287
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test is considered too permissive because it favors local government.70 The
second and much more stringent test, the "specifically and uniquely attrib-
utable test," originated in 1961 and requires that the impact fee be tied
uniquely and specifically to the incremental need for facilities, that the ex-
act users of the new facilities be documented, and that the fee paid be re-
lated to the need generated by each development." This test is considered
too restrictive because it favors developers.7 2 The more flexible intermedi-
ate standard, known as the "dual rational nexus" test, does not inherently
favor either the developer or the municipality. 7 The dual rational nexus
test balances the needs of both parties by providing local governments the
flexibility of preparing for future expansion, while not merely acting as a
rubber stamp of approval for the ordinance.74
Although the dual rational nexus test was first articulated in 1965 by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,75 its
general legal principal is best summarized by Florida's Fourth District
Court of Appeals in Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County.76 In Hollywood,
a developer seeking a permit to subdivide property for residential develop-
ment challenged a county ordinance imposing an impact fee to expand the
county's park system to serve the new subdivision.7 7 The court determined
the ordinance "was within the provisions of the county [home rule] char-
ter" and held that reasonable impact fee requirements are permissible so
long as they offset needs "sufficiently attributable" to the subdivision and
the funds collected are "sufficiently earmarked" for the substantial benefit
of the subdivision residents. In order to satisfy this dual rational nexus
test, the court held that:
70. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 223 (noting that the reasonable relationship test is extremely
deferential to local government exaction policy and has been associated with state court decisions ap-
proving of exactions with little direct cause and effect nexus shown).
71. Pioneer Trust and Say. Bank v. Vill. of Mt. Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961) (finding that
an exaction would be permissible if authorized and if the "burden cast upon the subdivider is specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable to his activity").
72. Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So.2d 863, 866 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 348 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1977) (finding that heightened standard undermined the ability of local
governments to plan for future expansion, in contrast to the previous "presumption of validity" ac-
corded most police power regulations).
73. Wald, 338 So. 2d at 866 (finding that the "rational nexus" approach provides a more feasible
basis for testing subdivision dedication requirements than the two methods of review discussed earlier).
74. Id.
75. Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965) (fee in lieu of dedication of land
upheld as condition of subdivision approval, when state statute authorized municipal subdivision regu-
lations to facilitate provision for, inter alia, schools and parks).
76. Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 61. To meet the requirements of the dual rational nexus test, "the
local government must demonstrate a reasonable connection, or rational nexus between the need for
additional capital facilities and the growth of the population generated by the subdivision. In addition,
the government must show a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of the
funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision." Id.
77. Id. at 607. The ordinance gave the developer the option of paying the fee, dedicating land in
lieu of the fee, or paying a fee equal in value to such dedicated land. See BROWARD COUNTY, FLA.,
CODE § 5-198(h).
78. Id. at 611. Citing City of Dunedin v. Contractors & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County, 358 So.
2d 846 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867
(1979); Wald Corp. v. Metro. Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 348
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[T]he local government must demonstrate a reasonable con-
nection, or rational nexus, between the need for additional
capital facilities and the growth in population generated by
the subdivision. In addition, the government must show a
reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the ex-
penditures of the funds collected and the benefits accruing
to the subdivision. In order to satisfy this latter requirement,
the ordinance must specifically earmark the funds collected
for use in acquiring capital facilities to benefit the new
residents."
In short, the first prong of the rational nexus test is satisfied so long as
the local government can show that the developer has created a need for
the additional public facilities and the impact fee imposed bears some pro-
portional relationship.so If the collected fees are used to offset the impact
of new development, the second prong is satisfied.s" Whether the commu-
nity at large may derive an incidental benefit from the impact fee is of no
consequence, and will not invalidate the fee. 82
So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1977); and Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App.
1972).
79. Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 611-12. With the articulation of a two-pronged standard in Dune-
din, the Florida appellate court rejected the more flexible "reasonable relationship" approach taken in
California concluding that it could no longer be used in Florida (emphasis added). Id.
80. Although state courts have expressed the link between cause and effect in different terms,
the consistent goal appears to be that of fashioning a test of proportionality that would limit develop-
ment exactions to amounts necessary to offset the burdens that the building would impose on the com-
munity. See generally St. Johns County v. N.E. Fla. Builders Ass'n, Inc., 583 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1991)
(is there a "reasonable connection"); Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 376 S.E.2d 22, 32 (N.C. 1989)
("prorated portion"); Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S. Jordan, 631 P.2d 899, 903 (Utah 1981) ("their equitable
share of the capital costs"); Simpson v. City of N. Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980) (rational
nexus means "substantial" nexus); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 835
(Mo. 1977) (exactions "to the extent" they create need); Land/Vest Props., Inc. v. Town of Plainfield,
379 A.2d 200, 204-05 (N.H. 1977) ("proportionality test"); and Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246
N.W.2d 19, 24-26 (Minn. 1976) ("reasonable portion").
81. S. Mark White, Development Fees and Exemptions for Affordable Housing: Tailoring Regula-
tions to Achieve Multiple Public Objectives, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 25, 31-32 n.26 (1990) "The
benefit requirement requires earmarking of the funds and is generally satisfied in three ways: (1) divid-
ing the jurisdiction into geographic zones and limiting expenditures to those zones, (2) placing a time
limit on the expenditure of the funds, and (3) placing the funds into a separate trust fund to guard
against commingling impact fee revenues with general revenues." Id.
82. Home Builders and Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs
of Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1983):
If by that argument it is Home Builders' position that the benefits accruing from roads con-
structed with the impact fees collected must be used exclusively or overwhelmingly for the
subdivision residents in question, we would have to differ. It is difficult to envision any capital
improvement for parks, sewers, drainage, roads, or whatever, which would not in some mea-
sure benefit members of the community who do not reside in or utilize the new development.
For example, landowners abutting a subdivision may well derive substantial benefit from in-
trasubdivision drainage facilities. Parks within subdivisions are not restricted to subdivision
residents only. Furthermore, intrasubdivision streets and roads may be extensively used by




Impact fees may also be challenged on the ground that they violate the
constitutional guarantees of equal protection. 83 Such a challenge is gener-
ally premised on the fact that impact fees are only levied on new develop-
ment and therefore deny developers equal protection under the United
States Constitution.8 4 To survive an equal protection challenge, a facially
neutral impact fee ordinance must (i) not be applied arbitrarily, and (ii)
must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.ss
This challenge was addressed in Ivy Steel and Wire Co. v. City of Jack-
sonville.86 In Ivy Steel, the City of Jacksonville sought to raise money for
general improvements to its sewer system to comply with federal water pol-
lution control standards." The improvements benefited all users of the sys-
tem and would have been needed whether or not any new users connected
to the system.8 8 Nevertheless, the city decided to fund the needed im-
provements by imposing a water pollution control charge on every prop-
erty owner whose property first received sewer services from the city's
sewer system after August 24, 1971, the effective date of the ordinance.8 9
Persons who had connected to the sewer system prior to that date were not
required to pay the charge. 90 A class action was brought seeking a declara-
tion that the ordinance denied equal protection by imposing the cost of
upgrading the system only on persons connecting to the sewer system after
a certain date.91 The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the ordinance
unfairly required one group of persons, specifically new users of the sys-
tem, to pay for improvements that benefited all users of the system, recog-
nizing "[n]o scheme of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property,
income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is
free of all discriminatory impact." 92 Challenges to impact fees on equal
protection grounds often fall victim to this same rationale. Thus, while
equal protection challenges are often made, they are seldom successful.93
83. Robert Lincoln & William Merrill III, Linkage Fees and Fair Share Regulations: Law and
Method, 25 URB. LAw. 223, 253 (1993).
84. Id.
85. See Nelson, supra note 61, at 545.
86. Ivy Steel & Wire Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 401 F. Supp. 701 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (holding that




89. Id. at 702.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Steel, 401 F. Supp. at 705.
93. See also Hollywood, 431 So. 2d at 611; Wald Corp. v. Metro. Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); and Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972); each contained equal protection challenges which were rejected.
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3. Takings
The final significant challenge that an impact fee ordinance is likely to
face, is that it results in a "regulatory taking." The Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment limits the power of local government to impose regula-
tions that condition the use of private property on a monetary payment or
dedication of land. 94 Although the United States Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue of monetary exactions directly, the Court has set out
the federal constitutional standards that must be met by physical exactions,
such as required land dedications.9 5 A number of state courts have applied
the same standards to impact fees.96
In Nollan v. California Coastal Cornission97 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard,98 the Court's holdings limited what a local government engaged in
land use control can exact from a property owner as a condition for devel-
opment. Specifically, the Court's holding in Nollan restricts the govern-
ment to those exactions which have an "essential nexus" to the anticipated
harm from the proposed development.9 9 In addition, the Court's holding
in Dolan requires that the burden placed on the property owner be in
"rough proportionality" to the development's impact (harm) on existing
infrastructure. 00 To meet the proportionality requirement, the Court es-
sentially adopted the dual rational nexus test employed by the majority of
state courts. 101 However, unlike those same state courts, Chief Justice
Rehnquist writing for the majority concluded that "[n]o precise mathemati-
cal calculation is required."1 02 Instead, only some sort of individualized
determination that the dedication is related in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development is required.0 3 Although the extent to
which Nollan's "essential nexus" and Dolan's "rough proportionality" test
apply to impact fees continues to be debated,10 4 local governments should
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V; See also Nelson, supra note 38, at 545. The Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the States.
See generally Chi. B. & O.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
95. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987).
96. See generally Richard Duane Faus, Exactions, Impact Fees, and Dedications-Local Govern-
ment Responses to Nollan/Dolan Takings Law Issues, 29 STETSON L. REv. 675 (2000).
97. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
98. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
99. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
100. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
101. Id. Instead of calling the "acceptable test" the "dual rational nexus test," the Court came up
with a new label:
We think the [dual rational nexus] test adopted by a majority of the state courts is closer to the
federal constitutional norm than either [reasonable relationship test or specifically and
uniquely attributable test]. But we do not adopt it as such partly because the term [dual
rational nexus] seems confusingly similar to the term "rational basis" which describes the min-
imal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
think a term such as "rough proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to be the require-
ment of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Nelson, supra note 24, Chapter 3:
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ensure that their impact fee ordinances satisfy these requirements to avoid
the possibility that its impact fee ordinance is found to constitute a tak-
ing-requiring the local government to provide "just compensation" to the
landowner.10 5
IV. MAYOR & BD. OF ALDERMEN, CITY OF OCEAN SPRINGS V.
HOMEBUILDERs Ass'N OF Miss., INC.
A. Background of the Litigation
In 2006, the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the extent to which
municipalities have the authority to impose impact fees on new develop-
ment in the absence of express enabling legislation in Mayor & Bd. of Al-
dermen of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss., Inc.10 6  The
Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the City of Ocean Springs (the "City")
adopted a Comprehensive Plan in 2001 authorizing the assessment, collec-
tion and expenditure of impact fees (the "Plan"). 107 The Plan set forth a
number of policies addressing the coordination of public facilities with
growth, including the need to develop impact fees to fund the pro rata
share of public improvements. 1os The Plan projected that at present devel-
opment densities, the City has approximately seventeen years before it was
built out and required the City "[p]lan for and equitably fund the efficient
provision of public facilities and services." 109
1. The Ordinances
In furtherance of the Plan, the City subsequently adopted several ordi-
nances (the "Ordinances") requiring that new development, as an individu-
alized condition of development approval, mitigate the need for public
facilities and infrastructure created by the development through the pay-
ment of a reasonable and proportional impact fee. 110 The Ordinances au-
thorized the assessment and imposition of fees upon six separate categories
[Ilmpact fees should not ... be subject to the Nollan/Dolan test because, in virtually all states,
they are subject to the dual rational nexus test, which is more stringent than Nollan/Dolan. It
guarantees that exactions, which meet the dual rational nexus test, could not be takings. If an
impact fee is valid (i.e., if it satisfies the dual rational nexus test), then it cannot destroy prop-
erty rights. If an impact fee violates the nexus test, it is invalid. Therefore, no takings analysis
is appropriate or necessary. Id.
105. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 262 (concluding that as states develop jurisprudence that fo-
cuses on their own state law and policy the impact of the Nollan/Dolan case line will diminish, because
those cases appear to have been confined to an extremely narrow set of circumstances-adjudicated or
individually-negotiated impact fees-which do not commonly occur); But cf. Ehrlich v. City of Culver
City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (holding that whether the heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan
applies to an impact fee depends upon whether the fee is an ad hoc or a legislative determination). The
court reaffirmed this rule in San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of S.F., 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002).
106. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 2006).
107. The City of Ocean Springs, Mississippi - Comprehensive Plan - Designing for the Future -
Adopted: June 19, 2001 (hereinafter "Comprehensive Plan"), available at http://www.oceansprings.org/
comp.plan.htm (last visited on Jan. 3, 2009).
108. Comprehensive Plan, supra note 107, Policy 57, 59, 61, and 62.
109. Comprehensive Plan, supra note 107.
110. Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Ocean Springs, No. 2003-00, 093(3) (Miss. Cir.
Ct. 19th Dist. May 24, 2004), affd., Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen, City of Ocean Springs v.
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of zoning classifications: single family, multi-family, office/general, com-
mercial/retail, light industrial and heavy industrial/manufacturing."' The
municipal services for which appropriations were authorized, and for which
separate impact fees were assessed included: general municipal services,
fire facilities, park and recreation facilities, police facilities, major road-
ways, and water facilities.'12
Whenever a builder or developer sought a permit to develop a parcel
of land within the City that fell into any one of the zoning classifications,
the Ordinances mandated that the developer pay six (6) separate impact
fees for the municipal services described in the Ordinances.' 13 Once col-
lected, the fees were deposited into an earmarked account separate from
the City's general municipal fund.11 4 The Ordinances required that the
earmarked revenues be spent on public facilities "necessitated by new de-
velopment," not on maintenance, operation, repair or personnel ex-
penses.' 15 The Ordinances also required that the collected fees be used to
fund only new capacity for the particular facility for which the fee was col-
lected and spent only within the service area from which it was collected.
116
2. Authority to Adopt
The City adopted the Ordinances pursuant to its police power, author-
ized under the home rule authority provided by statute and by the state's
planning and zoning laws.1 7 The home rule statute states that "governing
authorities of every municipality of this state shall have the care, manage-
ment and control of the municipal affairs and its property and finances.""s
The statute also provides that the powers granted to governing authorities
are complete without the existence of or reference to any specific authority
granted in any other statute or law of the State of Mississippi.1 19 Similarly,
Miss. Code Ann. Section 17-1-11(1)(a) provides, that "[t]he governing au-
thority of each municipality and county may provide for the preparation,
adoption, amendment, extension and carrying out of a comprehensive plan
Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss., Inc., 932 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 2006). The City identified its purpose as desiring
"to fix, impose and provide for the collection of . .. fees to finance, in whole or in part, the capital costs
of additional or expanded [services] required to accommodate new construction or development." Id. at
3.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Although the Court goes to great length to cite persuasive authority to support its conclusion,
it fails to adequately discuss the actual requirements of the Ordinances at issue. See Mayor and Bd. of
Aldermen, City of Ocean Springs, Miss., Appellants, v. Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss., Inc., et al, Appel-
lees, 2005 WL 4171137, 37 (2005) (providing a summary of how the Ordinances are to be administered
and what the Ordinances require).
116. Id.
117. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 50.
118. In 1985, the Mississippi Legislature did away with the general legal principle that a specific
grant of power was necessary for a municipality to take action by granting municipalities home rule




for the purpose of bringing about coordinated physical development in ac-
cordance with present and future needs . ... "120
3. Procedural History
Ten days after the Ordinances were adopted, the Home Builder's As-
sociation of Mississippi, Inc., together with a number of other homebuilder
and realtor associations, filed a Bill of Exceptions in the Jackson County
Circuit Court, setting out a facial challenge to the adoption of the Ordi-
nances, arguing that the impact fees constituted, inter alia, a per se illegal
tax which the City had no authority to enact. 121 No evidence was presented
challenging the reasonableness of the ordinances, including whether the
Ordinances were designed to address the problems created by new devel-
opments.122 Nor was an "as applied" challenge raised as to the application
of the Ordinances to any particular development. 123 The issue focused
solely on the City's authority, and the circuit court declared the impact fee
Ordinances to be a void taxing measure. 124 The City appealed the holding
to the Mississippi Supreme Court.
4. Ruling on the Claims
a. Express Authority
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court turned first to the issue of
express authority. The Court noted that the Mississippi legislature has yet
to adopt enabling legislation which would authorize the imposition of im-
pact fees.12 Citing Governor Haley Barbour's State of the State speech on
January 6, 2006,126 as well as a Development Impact Fee Report prepared
for the City,127 the court quickly disposed of the question of express au-
thority. The court stated in no uncertain terms that:
The State of Mississippi does not have a specific constitu-
tional provision or statute regarding implementation of de-
velopment impact fees, nor can authority be found in the
common law.128
Ultimately, the court concluded that "the taxing power of the sover-
eign is vested solely in the State and its relinquishment is never to be
inferred."' 29
120. Miss. CODE ANN. § 17-1-11 (2008).




125. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 48.
126. See Gov. Haley Barbour, State of the State Address (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://
www.governorbarbour.com/speeches/sos06.html (last visited on Jan. 3, 2009).
127. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 51 (noting that the report stated that the City's impact fee
program would be consistent with the "proposed" impact fee enabling legislation).
128. Id. at 50.
129. Id. at 52 (quoting Adams v. Kuykendall, 35 So. 830, 835 (1904)).
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b. Implied Authority
The court next addressed the City's argument that it was authorized to
adopt impact fees pursuant to its general police powers under Mississippi's
general planning and zoning statutes and home rule statute.1 30 The court
rejected this argument with very little discussion."13 The court held that
there are no provisions under the planning statutes which grant authority
to adopt impact fees or other revenue raising mechanisms to implement a
city's comprehensive plan.13 2
Although the court recognized that some states have upheld impact
fees in the absence of enabling legislation, the court noted that Missis-
sippi's home rule statute only grants municipalities the right to adopt those
ordinances respecting 'municipal affairs' which are not inconsistent with
state legislation and/or the Mississippi Constitution.3  While the court
agreed that the State's home rule statute does grant municipalities the au-
thority to impose "fees", provided the imposition is not inconsistent with
legislation or the Constitution, the court noted that the authority did not
include the authority to impose taxes. 134 Ultimately, the court concluded
that the impact fee Ordinances adopted by the City imposed taxes on new
development and therefore, there is "no constitutional basis, legislative en-
actment, or common law doctrine, which empowers cities to adopt and im-
pose development impact fees."' 35
c. Illegal Tax or Regulatory Fee
In Mississippi, local governments cannot levy taxes of any kind or in-
crease the levy of any authorized tax, unless otherwise authorized by stat-
ute.136 Accordingly, the Home Builders argued that the fees generated by
the impact fee Ordinances were being utilized for "general municipal pur-
poses" and as a "revenue raising mechanism" and were therefore invalid
taxes. 137 The City asserted, however, that the impact fees qualified as
"fees" because they were reasonably related to the infrastructure needs
created by the new development and were earmarked and deposited into
separate accounts.1 3 1 In addition, the City argued that the Ordinances
were reasonably related and roughly proportional to the need generated by
the development and were a valid exercise of the City's police powers. 39
130. Id. at 52.
131. Id. at 53.
132. Id.
133. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 53.
134. Id.; Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-17-5(2) (2008).
135. Id.
136. MIss. CODE ANN. § 21-17-5 (2008) ("Unless such actions are specifically authorized by an-
other statute or law of the State of Mississippi, this section shall not authorize the governing authorities
of municipalities to (a) levy taxes of any kind or increase the levy of any authorized tax, (b) issue bonds
of any kind . . . .").





In determining whether the City's impact fees constituted an illegal tax
or regulatory fee, the court noted "[t]he chief distinction is that a tax is an
exaction for public purposes while a fee relates to an individual privilege or
benefit to the payer." 140 Regulatory fees are charges to cover the cost of
the local government's use of its regulatory powers and are limited to the
proportionate cost of giving the fee payer that special attention. 141 To
qualify as a regulatory fee, the court adopted the position that "impact fees
must cover only the administrative expenses of the City in regulating devel-
opment or be compensation for a specific benefit or service on those paying
the impact fees." 142 Because the fees were "not based on the administra-
tive expense the City incurs in issuing the building permit," the court held
that the fees did not qualify as "regulatory in nature."143
In addition, the court found that in order to be regulatory in nature,
there must be a "specific benefit" conferred on the party paying the fee.1"
The City argued that the party paying the fee receives the "benefit" be-
cause the fee is earmarked in a separate fund and its use restricted to new
infrastructure that will benefit the new development. 145 The court, how-
ever, found this justification to be lacking because there is "little, if any,
assurance that such funds provide a special benefit to the class upon whom
the burden is imposed." 146 The mere act of opening a special account for
particular city services or facilities does not ensure that a "special benefit"
is conferred upon those utilizing the service or facility.147
The court further held that the City is responsible for general munici-
pal services that benefit the City as a whole. 148 Because the public services
identified in the Ordinances have traditionally been funded by tax reve-
nues, the court reasoned that "there would cease to be a need for exercis-
ing the taxing power of the State" if the City's rationale were adopted. 149
Citing judicial decisions from states whose laws on the subject are sim-
ilar so to that of Mississippi, the court held that the City's impact fee Ordi-
nances constituted an illegal tax because they were not limited to the
"administrative expense" incurred in issuing the permit and did not confer
140. Id. at 54 (quoting Miss. Att'y Gen. Op. 1996-0425 (1996)).
141. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 55.




146. Id. at 56.
147. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 56.
148. Id. at 56.
149. Id. (quoting Slip Opinion of the Circuit Ct. of Jackson County).
150. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 58 (finding that the "Iowa and Alabama decisions comport with
holdings of our federal courts interpreting Mississippi law"); See Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Des
Moines v. City of West Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 2002) (holding the impact fee did not qualify
as a regulatory fee authorized by the City's police powers); Armstrong v. City of Montgomery, 38 So.
2d 862, 863 (Ala. 1949) (holding that the power to assess private property for benefits received from
local municipal improvements to streets and sewers is a taxing power vested in the legislature and to be
exercised by a municipality must be expressly conferred by statue and when so conferred include neces-
sary incidental powers).
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any "special benefit" on the party paying the fee.'t The court rejected the
City's assertion that earmarking and depositing the fees into a special ac-
count provided the necessary "special benefit" to the party paying the
fee.'5 2 While the court did not find impact fees to be per se illegal, the
court did rule that the authority to implement the fees rests with the legis-
lature. 153 Accordingly, because the City did not have express authority to
enact the Ordinances, the impact fees were deemed invalid.15 4
B. Analysis of Mayor & Board of Aldermen, City of Ocean Springs v.
Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss., Inc.
1. Review of the Court's Analysis
Given the number of states that have found impact fees to be a legal
means of supporting new development, the Mississippi Supreme Court's
decision to invalidate the City's impact fees as an invalid tax invites further
discussion. The court based its conclusion on the holdings of three court
decisions. The court relied on the ultimate holding of these cases, but
failed to adequately address the factual distinctions between the cases and
the Ocean Springs Ordinances. As a result, the court's reasoning is flawed,
and it misconstrues what constitutes a regulatory fee.
a. Sweet Home Water and Sewer Ass'n v. Lexington Estates, Ltd.
The City relied on Sweet Home Water & Sewer Ass'n v. Lexington Es-
tates, Ltd. as authority to impose impact fees if they are reasonably propor-
tionate to the amount of need created by the developer.' In Sweet Home,
the owner of an apartment complex brought an action against the water
and sewer utility district for a charge to connect to the system and an im-
pact fee of $350 per unit.15 6 There, the Mississippi Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the utility district possessed the authority to charge an
impact fee.157 The Ocean Springs court, however, simply failed to address
the matter.' 58 Instead, the court seemed to adopt the circuit court's posi-
tion that the reasonableness of the Ordinance was irrelevant, and that with-
out express authority, an "impact fee" is by definition a tax simply because
151. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 55.
152. Id. at 56.
153. Id. at 59.
154. Id.
155. Sweet Home Water & Sewer Ass'n v. Lexington Estates, Ltd., 613 So. 2d 864 (Miss. 1993)
(striking down an impact fee, charged by a public utility, because there was no showing of
reasonableness).
156. Id. at 866.
157. Upon considering the position of both the Attorney General's Office (utilities are authorized
to assess impact fees pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §19-5-177(c)) and the Public Service Commission
(utilities are authorized to assess impact fees so long as they are reasonable), the Mississippi Supreme
Court concluded that a water and sewer district may, under Miss. Code Ann. §19-5-195, assess "rates,
fees, tolls, or charges" provided those assessments are reasonably calculated to provide for the system's
functioning and growth. Id. at 870.
158. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 60.
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it raises revenue.15 9 Unlike the impact fee ordinances in the Ocean Springs
case, however, the fees in Sweet Home were assessed only as to the apart-
ment complex owner. 6 o In addition, the utility district offered no evidence
that it "reasonably" needed to charge the impact fee. 161 Instead, the utility
district cited "fear" that the apartment complex would negatively impact
the system's operation as a basis for their imposition.162
While true the Sweet Home court declined to permit the collection of
impact fees under the circumstances, the court expressly recognized that
utility districts may assess 'rates, fees, tolls, or charges' under §19-5-195.163
The court did not base its holding on lack of authority. Nor did the court
view the matter as a fee versus tax issue. Instead, the court recognized
"that the impact fee assessed by the [d]istrict . . . was, at the very least,
arbitrary on its face and as applied and, at worst, discriminatory."164
By failing to distinguish the viability of impact fees under Miss. Code
Ann. §19-5-195, not only did the Ocean Springs court too narrowly defined
what constitutes a regulatory fee, the court has also called into question the
previously recognized authority of water and sewer districts to impose im-
pact fees."' Although both the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi
Public Service Commission agreed in Sweet Home that utility districts are
authorized to impose impact fees, the Attorney General's Office, relying
on Ocean Springs, now opines that Miss. Code Ann. § 19-5-195 does not
grant utility districts the authority to charge "impact fees" and that such
fees amount to an unauthorized tax.166
159. Sweet Home, 613 So. 2d at 870.
160. Id.
161. Id. (finding that the record revealed that the utility district established the fee: (1) in the
absence of a disparate classification of Lexington Estates as a separate class of customer; (2) in the
absence of an explanation of the fee's purpose; and (3) in the absence of identification of any increased




165. See Miss. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 2006-00355 (Aug. 11, 2006).
166. Miss. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 2006-00647 (Jan. 19, 2007) ("You have not asked, and this office
cannot opine, as to whether the Ocean Springs case does in fact render void any fees imposed by
RSUD. The RSUD is a utility district governed by a separate statutory scheme, not a municipal corpo-
ration. As such, the district's authority to charge and collect fees is governed by Section 19-5-195 of the
Mississippi Code . . . ."); But cf. Miss. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 2007-00097 (Mar. 20, 2007)("It is the opinion
of this office that, in accordance with the Ocean Springs decision, Section 19-5-195 does not grant to
utility districts the authority to charge "impact fees" and that such fees amount to an unauthorized
tax."). Notwithstanding the Ocean Springs decision and Attorney General Opinions, it appears that
impact fees continue to be assessed by public utilities. See 2007 Miss. PUC LEXIS 394 (Miss. PUC
2007) ("Impact fees will be charged to offset the cost of new residential business construction absorbing
capacity of the system. All impact fees must be paid for before requesting bids for service extensions.
This fee is in addition to contribution in aid-of-construction. The developer must pay in advance of any
construction an impact fee of $350.00 per lot for each family dwelling. No refund will be paid of this fee.
Impact fees shall only be assessed to the developer."); See also 2007 Miss. PUC LEXIS 395 (Miss. PUC
2007); 2007 Miss. PUC LEXIS 92 (Miss. PUC 2007).
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b. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des
Moines
As with Sweet Home, the Ocean Springs court failed to fully explore
the Iowa Supreme Court's reasoning behind their decision in Home Build-
ers Ass'n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des Moines.16 7 In West Des
Moines, the City appealed a lower court ruling enjoining the collection of
fees under the Mandatory Park Dedication Fee Ordinance as an illegal
tax.168 There, the court determined that a park fee imposed on residential
development was an excise tax, rather than a regulatory fee, because the
parks to be created with the fee did not provide a special benefit to the
developer.1 6 9 Although the City of West Des Moines argued that the mon-
ies collected through the park fees were spent solely on the neighborhood
parks for the benefit of the developers that generated the need, the court
stated that a neighborhood park is available for general public use and ben-
efits the entire community.1 7 0 The court found that the fee was based on
need, rather than impact, and concluded that the city imposed the fee to
raise revenue, making it a tax.1 Under Iowa law, cities must be expressly
authorized to impose taxes on residential development. 172 Because Iowa
law did not provide for such authorization, the court invalidated the fee.
While it is true that both states take a similar position with regard to
the fee versus tax analysis, the facts of both cases are sufficiently different
to warrant further analysis. First, the West Des Moines decision related
solely to park fees, while the Ocean Springs Ordinances cover six (6) sepa-
rate impact fees. Unlike the Ocean Springs impact fee, the park fee in West
Des Moines did "not prohibit the use of fees collected in one district from
being spent . . . in another district." 17 4 Moreover, although West Des
Moines had collected fees across the city, it had yet to spend the fees in two
districts and had no plans to do so in a third. 7 1 Consequently, the West
Des Moines park fee more closely resembled a revenue-raising tax than a
regulatory fee. 176
c. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss. v. City of Madison
The court's decision in Ocean Springs also did not address the fact that
under the federal court's analysis, impact fees could be valid if properly
crafted to avoid certain deficiencies.' 7 7 In Home Builders Ass'n of Miss.,
167. Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d at 348.
168. Id. at 344.




173. Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d at 350.
174. Id. at 344.
175. Id. at 345.
176. Id. at 348.
177. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss. v. City of Madison, 10 F. Supp. 2d 617 (S.D. Miss. 1997), affd
by Home Builders Ass'n of Miss. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1998) (concerning
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Inc. v. City of Madison, an as-applied challenge was filed challenging the
validity of the City of Madison's impact fee ordinance, which required de-
velopers pay a fee at the filing of a preliminary plat and in order to obtain a
building permit. " The plaintiffs alleged that although the impact fees
were being used for general revenue purposes, the impact fee ordinance
was merely a "regulatory fee" and therefore not subject to the Tax Injunc-
tion Act.' 9 The impact fee ordinance, however, did not, among other
things, require that the impact fees be earmarked for any specific purpose,
provide a method for determining the amount of the fee, or adequately
measure the actual burden a new development would create.1 so
Unlike the Ocean Springs court, the Madison court reasoned that
whether impact fees were taxes or valid regulatory fees "depends on the
language of the . . . ordinances and the [local government's] use of the
impact fees."' 1 After considering distinctions between fees and taxes, the
Madison court found that the City had not properly earmarked the impact
fee revenues, and thus deposited them into an account separate from the
general fund. 182 The Madison court also found that impact fee revenues
were being used for general revenue purposes, rather than being spent on
the public facilities required to serve new development.'8 3 Consequently,
the Madison court concluded that the City of Madison's impact fee ordi-
nance was a tax imposed to offset the cost of providing public facilities to
newly developed residential areas within the City rather than a regulatory
fee.' 8 4 Adopting the reasoning of the Madison court, the Fifth Circuit up-
held the ruling on appeal.'8 5
2. An Alternative to the Tax/Fee Distinction
Simply put, the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Ocean Springs
too narrowly defines what constitutes a regulatory fee.' 86 The purpose of
an impact fee is not to "raise revenue" as the court suggests.'87 Rather,
initial jurisdictional question of whether impact fee ordinance imposes a tax for purposes of the Tax
Injunction Act).
178. City of Madison, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 619. The plaintiff's complaint challenged the City of
Madison's selective imposition of impact fees against developers of single-family and multi-family
dwellings only (i.e., an equal protection challenge).
179. Id. Ironically, the City of Madison asserted that the district court lacked subject matter juris-
diction pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1341, referred to as the "Tax Injunction Act," because "the instant
municipal ordinance is not merely an assessment but a tax." In order to maintain its federal case,
plaintiffs argued that the Madison impact fees were regulatory fees and not taxes.
180. City of Madison, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
181. Id. at 625.
182. Id. at 620.
183. Id. at 625.
184. Id. at 626.
185. Home Builders Ass'n of Mississippi v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1998).
186. Ocean Springs, 932 So. 2d at 55 ("[t]o qualify as a regulatory fee, the impact fees must cover
only the administrative expenses of the City in regulating development or be compensation for a special
benefit fo service on those paying the impact fees.").
187. Id. at 56 ("If the rationale of the City were sufficient to impliedly vest municipalities with
revenue-raising authority by implication, there would cease to be a need for exercising the taxing power
of the State.").
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their purpose is to ensure that the costs associated with the development
are properly paid by those who benefit from the public facilities rather than
the taxpayers in general.""' Thus, impact fees help to ensure a more effi-
cient use of resources by forcing developers to "internalize" the costs of
their decisions (on whether and how to develop land).1 89 The court's deci-
sion fails to acknowledge the economic realities of real estate development,
realities for which local governments and taxpayers throughout Mississippi
must ultimately account.
The Ocean Springs decision essentially renders all impact fees void as
an invalid tax- regardless of how they are designed, implemented or ap-
plied. As a result, the burden of all new developments (that cannot be
remedied through land exactions) will be borne by the community at large
through higher taxes instead of by those who will actually benefit from the
new public facilities (i.e., the developer and those who purchase from the
developer).1 90 Rather than employ a superficial tax versus fee analysis, the
court should, as a number of other state courts have done, review the con-
stitutionality of impact fees under a "dual rational nexus" analysis- exam-
ining the fit between public policy ends and means under reasonableness
standards.191
Under this analysis, the court would first seek to determine whether
there is a reasonable connection between the "need" for new, additional or
expanded public facilities and the proposed development.192 Such a review
generally requires the court to consider whether the local government's
public facilities and services would become overburdened by a specific de-
velopment project.193 To satisfy this prong of the test, the burden is on the
local government to demonstrate that the methodology used to determine
the need for improvements funded by the impact fee is based on generally
accepted practices. 194 If a connection exists, the court must then deter-
mine whether there is a reasonable connection between the expenditure of
funds collected through the imposition of an impact fee and the "benefit"
that accrues to the proposed developer. '95 In doing so, the court should
consider criterion that bear on the reasonableness of the fee, including
among other things, the actual costs of constructing new facilities, the
formula used to determine the fee, the fee paid by a particular developer,
188. Guidebook, supra note 26, at 8-141.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See St. Johns County v. Ne. Fla. Builders Ass'n, Inc., 583 So. 2d 635, 638-39 (Fla. 1991);
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Home Builders
Ass'n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000).






the local government's contribution, improvements made directly by devel-
opers, the length of time between the payment of the fee and new construc-
tion projects, or whether the construction projects are site-specific to the
new development.196
The dual rational nexus analysis allows a reviewing court to balance
local government discretion and private property rights in addressing the
constitutionality of an impact fee. 197 The test recognizes the importance of
allowing local governments to make public policy determinations regarding
the potential impact of new development, while at the same time ensuring
that their determinations are supported by a demonstrable causal relation-
ship between new development and a detrimental impact on public facili-
ties. 198 In short, the requirements of the dual rational nexus test would
provide a sufficient basis for distinguishing valid impact fees from invalid
taxes.
V. THE NEED FOR ENABLING LEGISLATION
Although the Mississippi legislature has twice before considered im-
pact fee enabling legislation, both times the bills have died in committee
with no public record of the legislature's reasoning.1 99 First, Representa-
tive Daniel D. Guice, Jr. introduced legislation in 2000 designed to author-
ize those municipalities that had adopted comprehensive plans to impose
impact fees as a condition of development approval on future develop-
ment.200 Then, Senator Doug E. Davis introduced legislation in 2005
which, although it expanded upon the proposed authorization to impose
impact fees to include counties as well as municipalities, only granted the
ability to impose assessments against the property owner or, if a builder or
contractor was the property owner, the first purchaser, in an amount not to
exceed $1,000.00. 201
As a result of the Mississippi Supreme Court's recent decision in
Ocean Springs, the only hope that local governments now have of shifting a
pro rata share of public capital improvement costs to the developments
that create the need for those improvements is the passage of enabling leg-
islation. Given the continued growth throughout the state, it is important
196. Id. at 357.
197. Id. at 356.
198. Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d at 356 ("The first prong of the test decides whether the ordinance is
an appropriate method to address the city's stated interests, and the second prong assures that the city
and developers are paying their proportionate share of the cost of new construction.").
199. H.B. 179, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2000); S.B. 2967, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2005).
200. H.B. 179 is available at http://billstatus.1s.state.ms.us (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
201. S.B. 2967 is available at http:/Ibillstatus.1s.state.ms.us (last visited Dec. 20, 2008). Although
S.B. 2967 would have authorized local governments to enact impact fees ordinances, its benefit to local
governments as a financing tool would have been severally restricted-given that it would have capped
fees at $1,000.00 and protected developers by requiring that the fee be charged essentially to any but
developers.
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that local governments are equipped with the tools necessary to adequately
address the unique needs of their citizenry. 202
Enabling legislation would empower local government to determine
for themselves, whether the traditional financing mechanisms are sufficient
or whether alternatives are needed.2 03 Properly drafted enabling legisla-
tion could also serve to guide the creation of local ordinances that treat all
parties to the development process - local government, developers, and re-
sidents - in the most equitable manner possible. 2 04 Furthermore, it would
enforce a standard process throughout the state for implementing and ad-
ministering impact fees, while providing local government with the ability
to tailor them to fit their respective needs.205
There are a number of steps that the legislature could take to help
ensure that impact fee ordinances adopted pursuant to a newly enacted
enabling scheme withstand the various legal challenges they may face.2 06
First, in order to avoid a Mississippi court declaring an impact fee void as
an unauthorized tax or an unallowable exercise of local government power,
the enabling legislation should require that the impact fee ordinance con-
form to the requirements of the "dual rational nexus" test.207 Next, the
enabling legislation should ensure that no local government can charge de-
velopments more than a proportionate share of the cost of new facilities.208
Finally, the enabling legislation should ensure that all impact fee ordi-
nances adequately provide for certain procedural requirements, including
fee schedules, individual assessments, appeals, exemptions and waivers,
credits for dedications, the collection of fees, accounting, disbursement, en-
forcement and administrative costs. 209
Enabling legislation that incorporates such factors would provide
much needed guidance to the courts. 21 0 A court reviewing a case involving
impact fees would simply determine if the local government followed the
substantive and procedural standards set forth in the enabling
legislation.2 1 1
202. U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/
projectionsagesex.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). By 2030, Mississippi is projected to be the 33rd most
populous State with 3.1 million people.
203. Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 207 (discussing the justifications for the modern adoption for
impact fees).
204. Guidebook, supra note 26, at 8-142 (for impact fees to work properly, they must be at least
roughly equal to the public expense it is supposed to cover).
205. See generally Guidebook.
206. Guidebook, supra note 26, at 8-145 (for a discussion on a model development impact fee act
that incorporates best practices, and a comprehensive analysis of current approaches, see id. at 8-145-8-
166).
207. Nelson, supra note 23, at 26 (i.e., require the establishment of "a connection between new
development and the new or expanded facilities required to accommodate that development, identifica-
tion of the cost of those new or expanded facilities needed to accommodate new development, and
appropriate apportionment of that cost to new development in relation to benefits it reasonably
receives.").
208. Nelson, supra note 23, at 30.
209. Id. at 39.
210. See generally Guidebook, supra note 26, at 8-145.
211. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As a consequence of Oceans Springs, Mississippi courts must now ap-
ply an impact fee analysis that severely limits the ability of local govern-
ments to allocate the cost of public facilities to new development.
Although the impact fees are not per se illegal in Mississippi, they hold
little value to local governments in their current state and cannot, in the
absence of enabling legislation, be relied upon as means of requiring new
development "pay its own way." By adopting enabling legislation, the Mis-
sissippi legislature would empower local governments to decide how best
to allocate the costs resulting from the external effects of new
development.

